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BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action on an Order to Show Cause why 
the Respondent should not be held in contempt for fail-
ure to make alimony payments awarded to Appellant 
under a Divorce Decree and on Respondent's motion to 
modify the Divorce Decree respecting alimony payments. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court on the Order to Show 
Cause and Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce De-
cree. Judgment in favor of Appellant was entered on the 
Order to Show Cause and Judgment against Appellant 
was entered on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce 
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Decree. From the Judgment against Appellant on Re. 
spondent's Motion, Appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment against her 
on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree and 
reinstatement of the original Divorce Decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent were married at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the 17th day of September, 1949. On or 1 
about April 19, 1967, Appellant filed in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County a Complaint seeking a Decree of 
Divorce from Respondent on the grounds of mental cruel· 
ty. (AR 1)* In said Complaint Appellant also sought 
to be awarded an equitable portion of the assets accumu· 
lated by her and Respondent and sought a reasonable sum 
as alimony. 
Appellant filed a Consent and Waiver on May 17, 
1967, whereby she consented that the divorce hearing be 
held prior to the expiration of the 90-day waiting period. 
(AR 16) A Stipulation and Motion and an Entry of Ap· 
pearance, Consent and Waiver were filed on May 17, 1967 
for Respondent by and through his attorney, Mr. Grant 
C. Aadnesen, whereby Respondent acknowledged receipt 
of the Complaint and consented that the 90-day period be 
waived if the Court granted Appellant's motion. (AR 17) 
The hearing on Appellant's Complaint seeking a Decree 
*References are to pages of Abstract of Record 
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of Divorce was set for May 17, 1967, before the Honora-
able D. Frank Wilkins, District Judge of the Third Judic-
ial District. 
Prior to the date set for hearing of Appellant's Com-
plaint, the parties, by and through their respective coun-
sel, negotiated and entered into a detailed Property Set-
tlement Agreement on May 16, 1967. (AR 4) Said Agree-
ment was 13 typewritten pages in length and indicated 
that the Appellant and Respondent had carefully consider-
ed its provisions as all assets of the parties were listed and 
divided Article II of the Agreement made provision for 
an alimony settlement. (AR 11) It was agreed that Re-
spondent would pay to Appellant the sum of $1,000 per 
month, payable on or before the first day of each month, 
commencing June 1, 1967. Respondent's obligation to pay 
was to cease upon his death or upon Appellant's death 
or remarriage. 
It was further agreed in the Property Settlement 
Agreement that the alimony to be paid Appellant by Re-
spondent was reasonable in view of the efforts made by 
Appellant in assisting Respondent in his professional edu-
cation and in view of Appelant's present circumstances 
and social standing. The likelihood that Appellant would 
work and that her income would increase following the 
entry of the decree was expressly contemplated in the 
Agreement by both Appellant and Respondent and their 
counsel. The Agreement expressly provided in language 
not controverted that the alimony payments were not to 
be adjusted in the event of an increase in Appellant's in-
come. Also, the Agreement provided that the alimony 
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payments were not to be adjusted notwithstanding in-
creases or decreases in Respondent's income, unless sub. 
stantial changes occurred such that Respondent was rea-
sonably unable to pay the agreed alimony. 
The hearing on Appellant's Complaint was held on 
May 17, 1967. Respondent did not appear at said hearing, 
he having previously filed an Entry of Appearance, Con-
sent and Waiver. Appellant testified that she was familiar 
with the Property Settlement Agreement which had been 
filed with the Court and that she had read it, consulted 
counsel and signed the same. (AR 24) She declared her 
satisfaction with the division of assets and the alimony 
provisions. The Court inquired about the net worth of 
the parties after the Property Settlement Agreement and 
what each party would receive as a result of said Agree-
ment. It was stated by Appellant's counsel that each 
party would receive between $10,000.00 and $15,000.00. 
(AR 25) The Court was aware of the alimony provisions 
of the Agreement and questioned Appellant and her coun· 
sel about the earnings of Respondent and whether there 
was a cut-off date on the alimony. (AR 25) The Court 
wisely inquired into the substance of what is the essence 
of this appeal, and relating to the Appellant's employ· 
ment plans, the following exchange took place (AR 25): 
"THE COURT: Do you work now, Mrs. 
Felt, or do you intend to? 
THE WITNESS: I work part time. I do 
radio and TV commercials part time, and I hope 
to work again. 
THE COURT: That wouldn't surprise me. 
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THE WITNESS: Oh, well, you are very kind. 
THE COURT: So you can supplement your 
income, this one thousand, to some extent? 
THE WITNESS: Yes." 
A Decree of Divorce was granted to Appellant on 
May 17, 1967, according to the terms of her Complaint, 
except where modified by the Property Settlement Agree-
ment. (AR 19) Appellant was awarded certain prop-
erties and the sum of $1,000 per month alimony, as pro-
vided in the terms of said Agreement, which was fully 
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce and declared to 
be fair and reasonable. 
Respondent made the alimony payments required by 
the Divorce Decree during 1967 and 1968, but became 
delinquent in 1969. On October 7, 1969, Appellant filed 
a Petition For Order to Show Cause (AR 26) why Re-
spondent should not be held in contempt of Court which 
resulted in a Judgment against Respondent in the amount 
of $4,600, entered December 9, 1969. (AR 35) On No-
vember 14, 1969, Respondent filed a Motion to Amend 
Divorce Decree (AR 29) accompanied by his affidavit 
filed November 19, 1969 (AR 30), which alleged the 
following grounds in support of modification: 
( 1) He was prevailed upon by Appellant 
and counsel, both his and Appellant's, to consent 
to an alimony provision which was unreasonable 
and unfair, 
(2) He had remarried since the divorce. 
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(3) The work load he had to maintain to 
meet the alimony payments was professionally in. 
advisable. 
(4) His income had remained approximately 
the same but his professional and living costs had 
drastically increased. 
( 5) He had substantial indebtedness which 
he had not been able to reduce since the divorce 
because of the alimony payments. 
(6) The Appellant had obtained full time 
employment whereas she was employed only part 
time at the time of the divorce. 
(7) Appellant had substantial stock and in-
vestment plus properties received under the Di-
vorce Decree. 
(8) Appellant was in good health, employed 
and should not be dependent on him for her live-
lihood. She was well educated and qualified to 
earn a living. 
Appellant filed a Reply to Defendant's Affidavit 
on November 21, 1969 (AR 32), whereby she opposed 
Respondent's Affidavit and Motion to Amend Divorce 
Decree. She contended that the Divorce Decree was en-
tered in contemplation of the likelihood of her future 
employment and with knowledge of her education and 
training. Furthermore, Appellant argued that the Prop· 
erty Settlement Agreement which was incorporated in 
the decree provided that the alimony was not to be ad· 
justed regardless of her income. Appellant denied that 
Respondent had been prevailed upon to sign the Prop· 
erty Settlement Agreement and generally denied the other 
allegations of Respondent. Various documents were 
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thereafter filed by both Appellant and Respondent m 
support of their respective positions. 
Respondent again neglected to meet his obligation 
to pay alimony and was found to be in contempt of 
Court by a Judgment entered August 18, 1970 in the 
amount of $8,000. (AR 38) Thereafter, by Order of 
the Court filed August 18, 1970 (AR 38), hearing was 
set for October 1, 1970 on an Order to Show Cause why 
Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure 
to pay alimony and hearing was set for the same date 
on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree. 
Following the hearing held October 1, 1970, the 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, issued a Memorandum Decision on No-
vember 5, 1970 (AR 60), finding Respondent in con-
tempt of Court and modifying the alimony provision of 
the Divorce Decree by reducing it to $1.00 per year. 
On December 3, 1970, Appellant, through her attorney, 
filed a Motion For a New Trial and To Amend Memor-
andum Decision. (AR 63) Hearing was held on Appel-
lant's Motion January 18, 1971 and an Order Denying 
Motion for New Trial was entered on February 2, 1971. 
(AR 67) Also on February 2, 1971, the Honorable Gor-
don R. Hall entered an Order Modifying Divorce Decree 
and Respecting Contempt (AR 67) and filed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (AR 69) Appellant 
filed Notice of Appeal the 16th day of February, 1971. 
(AR 74) The content and grounds for the foregoing 





THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVER-
SIBLE ERROR BY RE-EXAMINING THE 
BASES OF THE DIVORCE COURT'S AWARD 
OF ALIMONY AND BY MODIFYING SAID 
AWARD. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO 
GIVE THE ALIMONY AWARD OF A DJ. 
VORCE DECREE THE FINAL STATUS AC 
CORDED TO ANY CIVIL JUDGMENT 
AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MOD. 
IFY THE DECREE ONLY WHERE THERE 
HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL OR PER-
MANENT CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES 
SINCE THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
The rules governing modification of the alimony 
portion of a Divorce Decree grant the Trial Court some 
discretion but do not permit re-examination of the evi· 
dence and modification at will. This Court recognized 
the foregoing principle in the case of Sorensen v. Soren, 
sen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180 (1968), where it 
stated at page 181: 
"Generally, the court is required to give such a 
decree the final status accorded to any civil judg· 
ment and to apply the doctrine of res judicata 
thereto. The parties should be entitled to rely 
on the finality of the alimony award in deter· 
mining the right to receive and the duty to pay." 
Although modification is permitted, as long as the de· 
cree stands, the husband must comply with it or make 
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every reasonable effort to do so, regardless of how the 
financial situation of his former wife may have im-
proved. Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 
(1948). 
With respect to the modification of divorce decrees, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5 (Supp. 1969), pro-
vides: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and 
children, as may be equitable. The court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such sub-
sequent changes or new orders with respect to 
the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of the property 
as sh:ill be reasonable and necessary." 
This statute has been construed to empower the Courts 
to modify an alimony award where there has been a 
substantial or permanent change in the material circum-
stances of either one or both of the parties since the 
decree was entered. Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra; Ander-
son v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1963); 
Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935). As 
more fully discussed hereinafter, however, the Courts 
may not consider events specifically contemplated by the 
Divorce Court and which served as the bases for the 
Divorce Decree and Property Settlement Agreement in 
determining whether there has been a change of cir-
cumstances. The party seeking modification must allege 
and prove a material and permanent change of conditions 
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since entry of the decree which would require under the 
rules of equity and justice, a change in the decree. Hen. 
ricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 (1936)j 
Carson v. Carson, supra; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 
Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925). 
Where a party is dissatisfied with a divorce decree 
or feels the alimony award is excessive, his remedy in 
the absence of a permanent and material change in cir-
cumstances is to prosecute a timely appeal. Otherwise, 
the decree cannot be modified. In commenting upon the 
procedures available to accomplish modification of a 
divorce decree, this Court observed in Cody v. Cody, 47 
Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916) at page 955: 
"We do not think the Legislature intended that 
the courts should review the allowances made by 
them for alimony in divorce proceedings, but what 
was intended was that, where material new con· 
ditions have arisen after the decrees were made, 
which conditions were not, and could not have 
been, considered or passed on by the courts, then, 
upon proper application and proof, the courts 
may make 'subsequent changes or new orders' 
respecting the allowance of alimony or the dis· 
tribution of property or the disposal of children. 
Where a party is dissatisfied with the original al· 
lowance or distribution of property, or the dis· 
posal of the children, he must prosecute a timely 
appeal to review the court's orders or decrees in 
that regard, and in such cases the review must 
be had upon the evidence adduced upon the orig· 
inal hearing. When the conditions have changed, 
however, as before stated, the changes or new 
orders must be based upon the allegations of the 
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changed conditions and the evidence in support 
thereof." 
The principles espoused in the Cody case were subse-
quently reaffirmed by this Court in Anderson v. Ander-
son, supra. Thus, unless the Trial Court's modification 
of the alimony award is founded upon a material and 
permanent change in the circumstances of the parties 
which has occurred since the entry of the Divorce De-
cree, the Trial Court exceeded its authority in modifying 
the alimony award. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S MODIFICATION 
OF THE ALIMONY AWARD IS FOUND-
ED UPON A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 
EVIDENCE UNDERLYING THE ORIG-
INAL DIVORCE DECREE AND A DETER-
MINATION THAT SAID DIVORCE DE-
CREE WAS UNFAIR AND UNREASON-
ABLE. 
At the hearing on Appellant's Complaint seeking a 
decree of divorce, the Court inquired into the pertinent 
circumstances of the Appellant and Respondent before 
granting the divorce. Appellant testified concerning her 
employment during the period of marriage and specific-
ally during the time Respondent was completing his 
medical training. (AR 24) The Property Settlement 
Agreement which has previously been executed by the 
parties was before the Court and Appellant commented 
that she was satisfied with the division of assets and 
the alimony provisions. (AR 25) The Court inquired 
in the amount of assets each party would receive pur-
suant to the Agreement and asked whether there was a 
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cut-off date on the alimony provision. It was explained 
to the Court by Appellant's counsel that the alimony 
payments would terminate in the event of Appellant's 
death or remarriage, or if Respondent was unable be. 
cause of a change in circumstances to earn the amount 
of money he was then earning, the alimony payments 
could be reduced. (AR 25) In response to further ques· 
tions by the Court, Appellant and her counsel stated that 
Respondent's gross income was in excess of $60,000 per 
year. (AR 25) 
Following the hearing on Appellant's Complaint, the 
Court awarded Appellant a Decree of Divorce on May 17, 
1967, which incorporated therein and adopted the Prop· 
erty Settlement Agreement as being fair and reasonable. 
Said Agreement was incorporated by the Court in its 
decree with full knowledge of the asset division, em· 
ployment history and prospects of Appellant, alimony 
payment provisions and earning capacity of Respondent. 
On or about November 14, 1969, Respondent filed 
a Motion to Amend Divorce Decree, accompanied by his 
affidavit setting forth eight grounds for modification. 
(AR 29) Although seven of the reasons set forth, which 
will be discussed hereinafter, may arguably be classi· 
fied as alleging changed circumstances, the first reason 
calls for a re-examination of the original decree. Re· 
spondent alleged that at the time of the divorce, he was 
prevailed upon by Appellant, her counsel and his counsel 
to consent to an alimony award that was unreasonable 
and unfair at the time. (AR 30) 
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At the trial held on Respondent's Motion to Amend 
Divorce Decree, it is evident that the Court permitted 
the premises and fairness of the Divorce Decree itself 
to be examined. Respondent's counsel declared in his 
opening statement that he did not intend the Court to 
be confined to the matter of whether there had been a 
change of circumstances on the part of either party, but 
intended to show that the decree itself prescribed an un-
reasonable burden on the Respondent and was basic-
ally unfair and founded upon erroneous premises that 
should be examined. (AR 40) Appellant's counsel ob-
jected to any attempt to broaden the proceeding into 
an inquiry into the basic fairness of the decree, however, 
the Court indicated it did not intend to unnecessarily re-
strict Respondent. (AR 40) The Court admitted having 
some reservations about whether the scope of the hear-
ing could be as broad as Respondent's counsel argued 
since there was a Property Settlement Agreement signed 
by the parties which had been adopted and approved 
by the Divorce Court. (AR 40) Nevertheless, the Court 
permitted Respondent's counsel to proceed as he had 
indicated. 
Appellant was examined by Respondent's counsel, 
Mr. Hunt, and over objection of Mr. Burton, Appellant's 
counsel, Mr. Hunt questioned Appellant at length con-
cerning her present earnings, living expenses, health and 
education. (AR 41) Appellant was also asked about her 
employment at the time of the divorce. (AR 42) On re-
direct examination by Mr. Hunt, Appellant further tes-
tified concerning her employment during her marriage 
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to Respondent. (AR 46) The Trial Court in permitting 
inquiry into Appellant's employment history prior to 
divorce, education, earnings and health, abused its dis. 
cretion since these factors were before the Divorce Court 
and taken into account in entering the Divorce Decree. 
Mr. Hunt next examined the Respondent and asked 
why he signed the Property Settlement Agreement which 
provided that the alimony payments were being made 
"in view of the efforts made by plaintiff in assisting de-
fendant in his professional education." (AR 47) Mr. 
Burton objected on the grounds that the inquiry was 
entering the area of impeaching the Divorce Decree. 
(AR 47) In overruling Mr. Burton's objection, the Court 
again indicated its intention to be flexible as to the scope 
of questioning and admitted Mr. Burton's position may 
be correct. (AR 47) Respondent then testified as to the 
reasons why he signed the Agreement. 
On cross-examination Respondent was questioned 
by Mr. Burton in regards to his allegation that he was 
prevailed upon by Appellant, her counsel and his coun· 
sel to sign the Property Settlement Agreement. Re· 
spondent admitted that he had discussed the terms of the 
Agreement with his counsel and specifically the alimony 
provision, and following said discussions had signed the 
same. (AR 51-54) He further declared that he had never 
discussed said Agreement directly with Appellant or her 
counsel and did not know what was meant by the state· 
ment in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon by ap· 
pellant and her course! to sign the Agreement. (AR 54-55) 
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Again, during cross-examination of the Appellant 
by Mr. Hunt, questions were directed to Appellant's em-
ployment and earnings in the initial years of marriage. 
She was also questioned concerning the sources of Ap-
pellant's and Respondent's support following his grad-
uation from medical school. (AR 58) Further inquiry 
was made into the issue of who furnished the costs of 
Respondent's medical schooling. (AR 58) 
At the conclusion of the testimony, Mr. Hunt reiter-
ated Respondent's position in his closing argument that 
the Divorce Decree was unfair, that the Property Settle-
ment Agreement should be re-examined, and the ali-
mony reduced. (AR 60) Although Mr. Hunt included 
allegations that there had been a change of circumstances, 
the thrust of his argument was that the decree was un-
fair and almost a fraud upon the Court. (AR 60) 
On November 5, 1970, the Trial Court entered its 
original Memorandum Decision in which Respondent 
was found in contempt of Court and the alimony award 
of the Divorce Decree was reduced from $1,000 per 
month to $1.00 per year. (AR 60) To support its mod-
ification of the alimony award, the Trial Court con-
cluded that the Appellant was well qualified from an 
educational and experience standpoint in her chosen field 
of endeavor to adequately maintain herself, particularly 
in view of the fact that Appellant had changed from 
part-time to full time employment since the divorce. 
The Court stated further that the Property Settlement 
Agreement and the alimony award were based in part 
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on a recognition of Appellant's efforts to assist Respond. 
ent in obtaining his medical education and found her 
efforts to be substantial in this regard. The Memoran. 
dum Decision then stated: 
"4. That the plaintiff is reasonably entitled 
to alimony for a given period of time sufficient 
to permit her to properly adjust to single life; 
however, to allow permanent alimony in the 
amount provided for in the Decree is unjust, un-
necesary, and not equitable and the Decree is 
consequently modified to provide for the payment 
of said amounts of alimony through the month of 
May, 1971, a period of four years in all, said 
payments to cease thereafter, except for the pay· 
ment of the nominal sum of $1.00 per year neces· 
sary to preserve the right of plaintiff to future 
assistance should a true need arise." (AR 62) 
Noticeably absent from the Trial Court's Memoran-
dum Decision is any finding that there had been a per-
manent or substantial change in the material circum· 
stances of the parties since entry of the Divorce Decree. 
Instead, the decision speaks in terms of the Decree being 
unjust and inequitable. The factors relief upon by the 
Court to substantiate its modification were considered 
by the parties prior to signing the Property Settlement 
Agreement and were before the Divorce Court. The 
reasons set forth by the Court do not justify a modifi-
cation of the alimony award. 
Appellant filed a Motion For A New Trial And To 
Amend Memorandum Decision on December 3, 1970. 
The main reason asserted in support of Appellant's mo· 
tion was that the reporter's notes of the divorce hearing 
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had recently been found and transcribed and that such 
transcript would clarify which factors had been consid-
ered by the Court in entering its Divorce Decree. (AR 63) 
At the hearing held on Appellant's motion, January 18, 
1971, the deficiencies discussed in the immediately pre-
ceding paragraph were brought to the attention of the 
Trial Court. The Court commented that in modifying 
the alimony award it did not intend to imply that the 
decision rendered by the Divorce Court was unjust or 
inequitable. (AR 66) It stated that by reason of a change 
in circumstances the decree had become unjust and un-
reasonable. Appellant's motion was denied on February 
2, 1971, and the Trial Court entered an Order Modifying 
Divorce Decree and Respecting Contempt the same date 
and adopted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
In upholding its prior decision which modified the 
alimony award, the Court adopted Findings of Fact in 
an attempt to correct the deficiencies existing in its orig-
inal Memorandum Decision. The facts therein stated, 
however, along with the statements by the Court that 
it did not intend to imply that the Divorce Decree was 
unjust or inequitable, fail to justify modification of the 
decree and do not disguise the fact that the Court under-
took a re-examination of the basis of the original Di-
vorce Decree. Said Findings state that Appellant is well 
qualified to adequately maintain herself, that Appellant 
is now employed full time, that Appellant is in good 
health, that the alimony award was based in part on 
recognition of Appellant's efforts, which were substan-
tial, in assisting Respondent in his medical education. 
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(AR 69) All of these factors were properly before the 
Court in the divorce hearing and considered by the 
parties in drafting the Property Settlement Agreement. 
The Court has, in effect, reviewed the basis of the orig. 
inal Divorce Decree and adopted Findings of Fact to 
support a contrary decision on the alimony issue. 
The Findings of Fact alter paragraph 4 of the orig. 
inal Memorandum Decision by adding the italicized por-
tion as follows: 
"8. That the plaintiff was reasonably en-
titled to alimony for a given period of time suf-
ficient to permit her to properly adjust to single 
life; as to the award and amount thereof at the 
time of the divorce decree, this court makes no 
finding; however, to continue to allow perman-
alimony in the amount provided for in the Decree 
in light of the present situation and circumstances 
of parties is unjust, unnecessary, and not equit-
able .... " (AR 71) 
Thus, by the addition of a few words, the Court seeks 
to correct the deficiencies inherent in its original Mem· 
orandum Decision. 
Said Findings of Fact further state that Appellant's 
income from employment and investments is suitable to 
maintain her and is higher than at the time of divorce, 
that Respondent has remarried since the divorce, that 
Respondent's income has increased but not commensu· 
rate with his cost of doing business and that substantial 
changes in the circumstances and situations of the parties 
hereto have occurred since the date of the Divorce De· 
cree. (AR 71-72) Again, the matters of Appellant's in· 
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come and Respondent's income were properly consid-
ered by the Court at the divorce hearing and by the 
parties themselves in entering into the Property Settle-
ment Agreement. The Findings also noticeably neglect 
to specify what substantial changes in the circumstances 
and situations of the parties have occurred. 
It is evident from the foregoing that at the hearing 
on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree, the 
Court re-examined the factual basis underlying the orig-
inal Divorce Decree and determined that the alimony 
award of the Decree was unfair and inequitable. The 
statements of Respondent's counsel plus the testimony 
adduced at the hearing on the motion to amend, clearly 
indicate that there was an inquiry into the basic fairness 
of the Divorce Decree. The original Memorandum De-
cision of the Court was premised upon factors which were 
properly contemplated by the Court at the divorce hear-
ing and considered by the parties in establishing the 
Property Settlement Agreement. Said decision made no 
reference to permanent or substantial changes in the ma-
terial circumstances of the parties as is required before 
modification of an alimony award can be ordered, but 
was phrased in terms of an unjust, unnecessary and in-
equitable alimony award. 
The statements by the Court at the hearing on Ap-
pellant's motion for a new trial to the effect that it 
did not intend to imply that the original Divorce Decree 
was inequitable do not correct the error. The issues 
examined and the testimony presented at the modifica-
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tion hearing plainly indicate an examination into those 
factors relied upon by the Court at the divorce hearing 
in entering its decree. Neither do the Findings of Fact 
adopted by the Court disguise the fact that the Court 
exceeded its authority in re-examining the premises un. 
derlying the Divorce Decree. The facts set forth in the 
Court's findings show that its modification of the aJi. 
mony award was not based upon a substantial change 
in the material circumstances of the parties. 
As was pointed out in the Cody case, supra, where 
a party is dissatisfied with the alimony award, he must 
prosecute a timely appeal to review the Court's order 
and in such cases a review may be had upon the evi· 
dence adduced at the original hearing. At the hearing 
on Respondent's motion to modify the Divorce Decree, 
the Court acted in the capacity of an Appellate Court 
in reviewing the Divorce Court's decree and thus ex· 
ceeded its proper authority. Appellant urges that this 
Court find that the Trial Court failed to apply the doc· 
trine of res judicata to the Divorce Decree but instead 
abused its authority by re-examining the basis of the 
Divorce Decree and modifying the alimony award absent 
a finding that there had been a permanent or substantial 
change in the material circumstances of the parties. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVER-
SIBLE ERROR BY CONCLUDING THAT AP-
PELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, 
EARNING CAP A CITY AND HEAL TH, PLUS 
RESPONDENT'S REMARRIAGE ARE SUFFI-
CIENT GROUNDS TO JUSTIFY MODIFI-
CATION OF A DIVORCE DECREE. 
A. EVENTS SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE PARTIES AND THE DIVORCE 
COURT AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE 
AND WHICH SERVED AS THE BASES 
FOR THE DIVORCE AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON THEIR SUBSE-
QUENT OCCURRENCE. 
The general rule regarding changes contemplated 
when the Divorce Decree was entered is stated in Anno-
tation, 18A.L.R.2d10, 21 (1951): 
"Where the alleged change in the circumstances 
of the parties is one that the trial court expected 
and probably made allowances for when entering 
the original decree, the change is not a ground for 
a modification of the decree." 
Thus, where it was contemplated by the Court at the 
divorce hearing that Appellant would obtain employment 
and the parties agreed in the Property Settlement Agree-
ment that an increase in Appellant's income would not 
be reason for reducing the alimony payments, Appellant's 
full time employment is not a ground for modification 
of the decree. 
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The foregoing principle was applied by this Coun 
10 the early case of Cody v. Cody, supra. In construing 
the forerunner to Section 30-3-5 of the present Utah Codi 
Annotated which authorizes subsequent changes in a de. 
cree granting alimony, the Court stated: 
"We do not think the Legislature intended that 
the courts should review the allowances made hr 
them for alimony in divorce proceedings, but wh;1 
was intended was that, where material new con. 
Jitions have arisen after the decrees were made, 
which conditions were not, and could not hai•e 
been, considered or passed on by the courts, then, 
upon proper application and proof, the courts may 
m<lke 'subsequent changes or new orders' respect· 
ing the allowance of alimony or the distribution of 
property or the disposal of children." (emphasis 
added) 
Applying the rationale of Cody to the instant case, the 
Trial Court did not have the authority to modify the ali· 
mony award on the basis of conditions which were con· 
sidered and passed on by the Court at the divorce hearing. 
In the case of Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 
P.2d 1021 (1970), this Court again applied the rule gov· 
erning modification in the light of the occurrence of 
events contemplated by the Divorce Court. The plaintiff 
in Allen was granted a decree of divorce and awarded ali· 
mony of $200 per month. At the date of the granting of 
divorce, plaintiff was not employed but contemplated 
securing employment within six months. The divorce 
hearinL': was conducted as a default matter but the defend· - a 
ant w:is present and in effect stipulated to the terms of 
the settlement as decreed by the Court. Shortly following 
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the divorce hearing, plaintiff secured employment and at 
the time the petition for modification of the decree was 
heard she was earning approximately $210 per month, 
net. The defendant's petition for modification was predi-
cated upon a substantial change in the material circum-
stances of either one or both of the parties since the entry 
of the decree. In commencing upon defendant's conten-
tions, the Court stated at page 1022: 
"He bases his contention on several facts, one of 
which is that the plaintiff has permanent employ-
ment, and he seeks a discontinuance of the alimony 
allowance of $200 per month. However, the decree 
of divorce, when granted, contemplated that the 
plaintiff would secure employment and contribuate 
to her own support. The defendant further con-
tends that since the former residence of the parties 
was sold, and the proceeds divided, this fact consti-
tutes a material change in the plaintiff's financial 
circumstances. However, here again, there is a 
development that was contemplated at the time 
of the trial court's decree." (emphasis added) 
Subsequent to the Allen case, this Court rendered its 
decision in Short v. Short, Utah 2d , 481, P.2d 
54 (1971). In that case, Mrs. Short, who was unemployed 
at the time, was granted a divorce and awarded $75 per 
month for alimony and a like amount for child support. 
Mrs. Short, who had been employed in the past, obtained 
employment after the decree and Mr. Short filed a peti-
tion to eliminate the alimony on the ground of changed 
circumstances. Relief was denied Mr. Short by the Trial 
Court on three different occasions and he appealed. In 
upholding the Trial Court's dismissal of Mr. Short's peti-
tion, this Court observed at page 5 5: 
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"It appears obvious to us that the award in the 
decree was consistent with and based upon the as. 
sumption that Mrs. S. again would be able to ob. 
tain employment, - otherwise the trial court', 
socio-economic philosophy would have been super. 
ficially inane. 
In the instant case, we must and do assume that 
the court did not intend that the $75 alimon1 
award would be eliminated if Mrs. S. obtained a 
job paying $75 per month, - or even $175 per 
month, - or even $389 per month, the income of 
Mrs. S. at her job at time of the third petition to 
eliminate the alimony." 
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the 
Cody) Allen and Short cases, where the alleged change in 
circumstances is one that the Trial Court contemplated 
and probably made allowance for when entering its 
divorce decree, the subsequent change is not a ground for 
modification of the decree. This is especially true in the 
case of a wife's contemplated employment following the 
decree. 
The Trial Court at the divorce hearing was fully 
aware of Appellant's employment history and her inten· 
tion to obtain full time employment after the divorce. 
As more fully set forth in the Statement of Facts herein, 
the Court specifically asked the Appellant if she worked 
or intended to, and she replied that she worked part time 
and hoped to work again. (AR 25) The Property Settle· 
ment Agreement was also before the Court in which the 
parties had agreed that changes in Appellant's income 
would not be grounds for reducing the alimony payment 
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prov1s1on. The Divorce Decree was entered by the Court 
with full knowledge of Appellant's intention to seek full 
time employment. Therefore, as a matter of law, Ap-
pellant's return to full time employment and the ensuing 
increase in her income is not a change of circumstances. 
Thus, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 of the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact (AR 70-72) adopted after the hearing on 
modification do not constitute changed circumstances upon 
which modification of an alimony award can be based. 
The Cody, Allen and Short decisions are based upon 
excellent reasoning, sound logic and fairness to the parties. 
Where the parties in a divorce action and their counsel 
all contemplate that a wife may become employed or her 
income may be augmented by additional working effort 
after the decree has been entered, and the trial judge con-
siders such circumstances and bases his decree thereon, 
there is strong reason for giving effect to the agreement 
and understanding of the parties, as approved by the trial 
judge. It is manifestly unfair, where the wife in reliance 
upon such agreement and the Trial Court's decision with 
respect thereto, seeks additional employment upon the 
understanding that it will not affect her alimony or prop-
erty settlement arrangements, only to find out later that 
another judge can re-evaluate the circumstances and enter 
a new order dictating the exactly opposite effect of the 
decree of the trial judge. If Cody, Allen and Short were 
not correct decisions, the divorced wife in these circum-
stances, who avoids work and efforts to contribute to her 
own support, may be better off economically than the 
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wife who in reliance upon the Trial Court's decision at. 
tempts to improve her lot in life by seeking self-em. 
ployment. 
B. RESPONDENT'S VOLUNTARY ACT OF 
REJ\fARRIAGE SHOULD NOT BE CON. 
SIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER 
THERE HAS BEEN A PERMANENT AND 
M A T E RI A L CHANGE OF CIRCUM. 
STANCES. 
The law is clear that the remarriage of a party foJ. 
lowing a divorce and the assumption by him of the obliga· 
tion to support a new wife and child is not a basis for 
modification of an alimony award. In Sorensen v. Soren· 
sen, supra, the defendant alleged six grounds for modifica· 
tion of the alimony decree, one of which was his remar· 
riagt: and assumption of the obligation to support a wife 
and to assist her in caring for her handicapped child. The 
Trial Court reduced the alimony from $1,250 per month 
to $1,000 per month. This Court reinstated the original 
alimony award on appeal and stated that defendant's act 
of remarriage "involved voluntary action on the part of 
the defendant and, under the circumstances, [was] not 
available to him in justification for reducing the alimony." 
Application of the Sorensen case necessitates the conclu· 
sion that paragraph 10 of the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact does not constitute a change of circumstances upon 




THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL C 0 UR T ' S CONCLUSION THAT 
THERE HAS BEEN A PERMANENT AND 
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUFFICIENT TOW ARRANT A REDUCTION 
IN ALIMONY. 
Eliminating paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 from the 
Trial Court's Findings as not stating sufficient changed 
circumstances for the reasons previously discussed, leaves 
only paragraphs 11 and 14 plus portions of the foregoing 
paragraphs which allege an increase in Appellant's in-
come from investments as possible bases for the Court's 
modification of the alimony award. It is asserted in part 
of paragraph 12 that Appellant's income from investments 
is substantially higher than at the time of the Divorce 
Decree, however, there is no finding as to the amount of 
the alleged increase in investment income. In fact, the 
only evidence before the Court as to the amount of Appel-
Iant' s income from investments was her uncontroverted 
testimony that her income from stocks and bonds amount-
ed to $100.00 per year or less. (AR 42) 
Paragraph 14 of said Findings merely states: "Sub-
stantial changes in the circumstances and situations of 
parties hereto have occurred since the date of the Divorce 
Decree." There is no indication whatsoever as to what 
changes in circumstances the Court is ref erring to in the 
foregoing finding. If said changes are those alleged in 
the preceding paragraphs of the Findings, paragraph 14 
adds nothing, since the preceding paragraphs fail to re-
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cite any amounts, facts or other evidence to substantiatt 
the conclusions that there have been changes in Appel. 
lam's income, education or health since the decree. u 
said paragraph 14 was intended to refer to other changes 
the Court has failed to so specify. Thus paragraph 14 o/ 
the Findings is not a proper basis for the Trial Court\ 
modification of the alimony award. 
Paragraph 11 of the Findings declares: 
"Since the Divorce Decree herein, defendant's 
costs of doing business has substantially increased: 
his income has increased but not commensuratt 
with the increase in cost of doing business." (AR 
72) 
Once again, the Trial Court has failed to specify the par· 
ticular changes in circumstances it relied upon to supporr 
modification of the alimony award. No amounts are ser 
forth and no other evidence is referred to which indicatei 
that the Respondent's cost of doing business has substan· 
tially increased. Appellant contends that even viewing 
the evidence most favorably for Respondent, said para· 
graph 11 does not state a change of circumstance sufficient 
to permit a reduction in alimony from $1,000 per month 
to $1.00 per year. Respondent's Exhibit 14-D admitted as 
evidence at the trial shows that the business expenses oi 
his medical practice were $38,973.00 in 1967, $38,490.00 
in 1968, and $43,213.00 in 1969, an increase of $4,240.00, 
or approximately 10 to 12 percent. Appellant contends 
that this increase is not a substantial change and is not 
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a sufficient basis for reducing or in fact completely elim-
inating the original alimony award. 
It is evident from the foregoing that the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact are not findings but merely conclusions. 
The failure to make proper fin dings further illustrates 
that the Trial Court's decision to modify the alimony 
award is not based upon evidence presented at trial but 
upon the conclusion that the alimony award of the original 
Divorce Decree was unreasonable and inequitable. Ap-
pellant submits that the evidence does not support the 
Trial Court's alleged Findings and therefore does not 
support its conclusions and decision to modify. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a petition for modification of the alimony 
award of a divorce decree, the Court may modify the ali-
mony award only where there has been a substantial or 
permanent change in the material circumstances of the 
parties since the divorce decree. The Court may not re-
examine the basis for the divorce decree and modify the 
alimony award upon a finding that said alimony was un-
reasonable or inequitable when awarded. The Memor-
andum Decision of the Trial Court, the Findings of Fact 
and the testimony adduced at the hearing on Respondent's 
Motion to Amend Divorce Decree all indicate that the 
Trial Court's reduction of the alimony award was premis-
ed on the conclusion that the original alimony award was 
unfair and unreasonable. 
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In determining whether there has been a substantial 
change in the material circumstances of the parties since 
entry of the divorce decree, the courts may not rely upon 
changes in circumstances, which were expected, contem. 
plated or considered by the Divorce Court when entering 
its decree. Such changes, as a matter of law, are not 
grounds for the modification of an alimony award. Since 
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact which relate to Appel. 
lant's employment, earning capacity and education involve 
matters which were contemplated by the Divorce Court. 
Respondent has failed to sustain his burden of proof that 
there has been a substantial change in the material circum. 
stances of the parties. The Trial Court therefore commit· 
ted error in granting Respondent's Motion to Amend Di· 
vorce Decree. 
On the basis of the foregoing argument, Appellant 
respectfully prays that this Court reverse the Trial Court's 
action in granting Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce 
Decree and reinstate the alimony provisions of the original 
Divorce Decree: 
1. By determining that the Trial Court modified 
The Divorce Decree upon a finding that the 
original Decree was inequitable and thus ex· 
ceeded its authority. 
2. By determining that there has been no s~b· 
stantial or permanent change in the material 
circumstances of the parties since entry of the 
Divorce Decree. 
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3. By awarding to Appellant her costs incurred 
herein together with a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clifford L. Ashton 
Richard H. Stahle 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy 
Suite 300, 141 East 1st South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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